A CASE STUDYFor many years in Australia and certainly since the Ash Wednesday 1983
fires in South Australia and Victoria, a much discussed and controversial
issue that arises out of major wildfires involving closer settled areas is
evacuation, that is, whether to implement a large scale movement of people
out of the path of a wildfire.
South-eastern Australia has a significant history of life loss due to
wildfire that goes back to the time when the early settlers first began to
move inland to take up land for agricultural purposes, harvest timber or
search for precious metal. While the early casualties could be attributed to
the settlers being mainly from the northern hemisphere and unfamiliar with
the wildfire characteristics of the Australian bush, today there should be
no excusing the community apathy that allows lives to continue to be lost as
late as the summer of 1994.
One striking example of the heavy cost of this lack of knowledge of
wildfire was in Victoria, where, during the early days of January 1939,
"hundreds of fires that had been burning spasmodically across a large part
of the State gathered into a series of vast conflagrations" (Noble 1977).
These fires reached their climax on 13 January, Black Friday, when
seventy-one people lost their lives. Many of those who lost their lives were
timber workers and their families living and working at sawmills deep in the
eucalypt forests, with virtually no fuel reduction to protect the mills, or
fire fighting equipment available.
Victoria learned from this experience, one result being the relocation of
sawmills out of the forest, a significant move toward reducing the
vulnerability of these bush communities.
The experience of the 1939 fires also provided much of the framework for
the Country Fire Authority (CFA), a single agency that would be responsible
for fire prevention and suppression outside Melbourne, state forests and
national parks. From the beginning, CFA rural fire brigades have been an
important part of life in country Victoria. One benefit from this rural
community affiliation with their fire brigades is a good understanding of
wildfire and how to survive.
As will be seen later, the farming community seems better able to
withstand wildfire, probably because wildfire is a part of country life.
The Hobart fires (1967), the Ash Wednesday fires in South Australia and
Victoria (1983) and the New South Wales fires (1994) demonstrated that it is
the people who live in the timbered urban/bushland interface areas where the
city dweller meets the bush, who are most vulnerable to wildfire.
Regrettably, until evacuation and all the related issues are fully
addressed, unnecessary loss of life and property will continue. This paper
presents some of the information that is available to those charged with the
responsibility for developing appropriate strategies and also a view on how
civilian life safety should be managed. The Victorian summer of 1982/83 followed an exceptionally dry winter and
spring. While this lack of rain generally had severe consequences for the
conditions and characteristics of forest and grassland fuel sources, it was
particularly felt in the forests where fuels were very dry, and on being
ignited under extreme fire weather conditions produced extreme fire
behaviour.
The potential for serious fires in the approaching summer was recognised
during the spring, and some effort had been put into community education
campaigns in the media, with individuals urged to reduce the fine fuels
around their homes, the need for firefighting equipment, etc. The reality
that CFA brigades could not be expected to protect every property likely to
be involved in a fire occurring under extreme fire weather conditions was
announced in some areas and the need for self help at the individual level
promoted. Added to this, municipal officers responsible for fire prevention
were urged to ensure that all steps were taken to force the removal of fire
hazards on private lands, where landholders were not doing this of their own
volition.
Some brigades in the areas that would suffer major fires had also done
some work to inform their communities of what the approaching summer might
bring and how to prepare.
Wednesday, 16 February 1983 - since known as Ash Wednesday - developed as
a very hot and dry day, with strong north to north-westerly winds. A very
strong south-westerly wind change entered south-west Victoria late in the
afternoon, reaching Melbourne at approximately 2100 hrs. A total fire ban
was imposed for the whole of the State. Nevertheless, 180 fires were attended
by the CFA, with eight of these fires reaching major proportions.
Four of these major fires involved the timbered urban/bushland interface.
Three commenced mid-afternoon and ran before a strong north to north-west wind
for several hours until they came under the effect of a very strong and
prolonged south-westerly wind accompanying the passage of a cold front.
The fourth started in the early evening and approximately one hour later
came under the effect of the south-westerly wind. Each of these fires
impacted on residential areas in the interface at, or shortly after sundown,
with the residents becoming involved in violent wildfire in the dark. Loss of
electricity due to fire damage to the transmission network added to their
difficulty. During the run of the Ash Wednesday fires in Victoria, thirty-two civilians
lost their lives. The four fires involving the urban/bushland interface
claimed twenty-four of these lives.
An analysis of civilian deaths in Victoria on Ash Wednesday, by Krusel
and Petris (1992) revealed that the circumstances of those deaths could be
categorised as:
1. Victims who recognised the real threat to their
safety with enough time to save their lives, but chose an ineffective
survival strategy;
2. Victims who did not recognise the real threat
to their safety in time to implement an effective survival strategy;
3. Victims who were physically incapable of
implementing an effective survival strategy.
Krusel and Petris categorised the circumstances of the civilian deaths as follows:
Return to Contents
Return to Contents
| Category 1 | Category 2 | Category 3 | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| 13 | 12 | 7 | 32 |
Age was also revealed as a major factor in people being able to survive wildfire; of the thirty-two civilian deaths on Ash Wednesday in Victoria, twenty-two were aged fifty years or more. At Mt Macedon, all five victims who lost their lives in houses were aged in excess of fifty-five years.
Following these fires there was considerable debate in Victoria on whether mass evacuation of
settled areas was the solution to preventing loss of life. Since then, there have been at least
two attempts to introduce legislation empowering police to order evacuations in the event of
wildfire. Fortunately, reason has prevailed, with the pecuniary interest provision of the Country
Fire Authority Act continuing to allow residents to chose whether they should evacuate.
Return to Contents
A decision to initiate a mass evacuation should not be made without first considering the many factors influencing a successful outcome.
Wilson and Ferguson (1984) stated that "staying in houses during bushfires poses risks; but so also does evacuation."
Of the thirty-two civilian deaths in Victoria on Ash Wednesday, only seven actually occurred in houses. Notably, these seven were all lost in houses situated in three of the four earlier mentioned interface fires. Also notable was the loss of only seven lives in circumstances where approximately 2000 houses were destroyed - it must be added that many of the houses lost in one of these fires were holiday homes that would have been unattended at this time of year. Nevertheless, the small number of lives lost in these circumstances is significant.
Clearly, there were more lives lost in the open (some victims were found quite close to houses) or in cars, than were lost in houses.
Reporting on their study of the impact of the Ash Wednesday fire in Upper Beaconsfield, Victoria, Lazarus and Elley (1984) commented that "people who were prepared, that is, those who had prepared their homes prior to and on the day, as well as themselves, were relatively safer than those who fled onto the already overcrowded exit roads." Without quoting the findings of several other researchers, it is a fact that many people survived the Ash Wednesday fires sheltering in houses.
There are also numerous reports, both formal and anecdotal, of many people who sheltered in their homes, or returned home shortly after the fire front had passed, saving their homes by extinguishing small fires caused by burning debris deposited against or inside the building by wind.
From examination of the results of research into the effect of wildfire on buildings by Doctor Caird Ramsay, CSIRO and others, following the "Ash Wednesday" fires, it is clear that wildfire "can attack a house in three ways: by direct flame contact, by radiation, and by flying embers. ...little evidence was found of the first two playing a major role." (Bell 1985). Strong wind also has an influence in that in addition to carrying burning debris, wind can cause windows to break, or otherwise breach the structure, thereby allowing the penetration of windborne burning debris.
It is neither necessary, nor appropriate to elaborate on the action required to enhance the survivability of structures (houses) exposed to wildfire, in this paper, as much has been produced by individuals and groups, nationally and internationally. A recent example is the CSIRO Standards Australia publication Building in bushfire-prone areas - Information and advice, SAA HB 36-1993. Suffice to say that survival of a house exposed to wildfire is dependant on a range of preventative and mitigatory actions - some of which are quite simple - prior to and during the passage of the fire .
A not so well known outcome of wildfire can be the heavy financial and psychological costs
associated with the loss of a family home. Community welfare agencies that deal with people who
have lost their homes in these circumstances would be able to provide evidence to support the
view that the community should be given the information necessary to enable the individual to
decide whether to stay and fight or evacuate.
Return to Contents
Miller, Carter and Stephens (1984), in their report on the "Ash Wednesday" fires, listed the
following as the main problems associated with the protection and evacuation of communities
threatened by wildfire:
Mass evacuation in the event of wildfire is a difficult option, as "warnings of impending danger become increasingly difficult to issue the shorter the lead time available between the knowledge that a danger threatens and when it is anticipated that it will occur. The difficulty is accentuated when the exact time and location of impact are uncertain." (Oliver, Britton and Hannes 1984).
Of course, minor and individually based decisions to evacuate could be to move a short distance
to a neighbouring house to shelter with others until the fire has passed.
Return to Contents
The rights of the individual to stay and protect his/her home must be recognised, as this in itself can be a sound strategy for surviving the passage of wildfire. Indeed, the presence of people prepared to fight for their homes may be all that is required in many cases to save those homes. The desirability, indeed the right of individuals to make this choice is defended by Miller, Carter and Stephens (1984), and also Wilmoth (1992).
A decision to stay and fight must be based on a well prepared home and the persons involved being physically and psychologically capable. The decision must also be based on the understanding that there should be no last minute change of plans and evacuation attempted immediately in the face of the fire. There are numerous examples of people who have lost their lives in this situation.
When considering whether to stay and fight, or go early, residents must consider the
following:
For individuals to make the right decisions on whether to stay and fight, or evacuate they must be well aware of their environment or "bushcraft" (Lazarus and Elley 1984); fire behaviour - in South Australia and Victoria the effect of the westerly wind change; how to prepare their homes and themselves to survive, possibly without the assistance of the fire brigade; and who should evacuate early.
To be effective, this community education process must actively seek to dispel the myths about Australian wildfires, for example fire fronts do not "move at such phenomenal speeds as sometimes reported in the popular press" and houses generally don't "spontaneously explode in the path of a fire" (Vines undated). This education process must include the media, for it is the media that does much to fuel these myths and the panic that can result.
The Upper Beaconsfield study by Lazarus and Elley (1984) also revealed that those people who were unsure "about the way a bushfire 'works', that is they did not have information on the movements of a fire front, the way embers and sparks fly, or the way in which houses were likely to burn down. …expected the fire to cause their homes to combust on impact." These people "had reason to panic because they lacked information on what was likely to happen."
While there is potential for loss of life from wildfire right across the settled areas of rural Australia, as has been stated earlier the major risk is in the urban/bushland interface areas. Therefore, particular use must be made of the media to help develop an awareness of environment in the interface community, including fire behaviour and how to prepare to survive.
This education campaign must include advice on the need for all in the community to be aware of the fire danger on a daily basis, to be observant of their surroundings, particularly smoke, or other activity associated with a developing fire. During bad days they should monitor radio/ television for authoritative advice on what is happening and actions recommended by the combating authority.
Fire behaviour and survival technique must also become an integral part of school education at
primary and secondary levels, delivered in a manner and using material that is compatible with
curriculum standards.
Return to Contents
Given the large areas that can be involved in wildfire, the emergency management agencies involved may be hard pressed, even unable to provide leadership, or protection on a personal basis to every individual in the community prior to and in time of fire crisis.
In their report on the Ash Wednesday fires Miller, Carter and Stephens (1984) make numerous references to a need to "achieve community identity with the fire problem at local level, where the problem arises and has to be fought."
In an article Community Involvement: The Missing Link, Ronald Jones (1987),cited Neighbourhood Watch as a useful model to be contemplated when considering how to involve a community in preparing to survive wildfire. Jones referred to a need to form "cells" of approximately twenty households "all sharing the same fire protection problem", and recruiting a volunteer from each "cell" to be leader.
Jones advocated that these volunteer cell-leaders would need to be "a well-liked member of the neighbourhood, energetic but not aggressive, enthusiastic but not bigoted, articulate and, above all, patient" and preferably not "active members of the local bush fire brigade." Broadly, the role of the cell leader would be that of a rallier, focussing the attention of all the families, including the children, on preparing to survive wildfire as a community and also the link with the fire brigade.
The CFA has recognised the importance (and the difficulty) of gaining ongoing community commitment to wildfire survival and all that this entails in developing its community group program known as Community Fireguard.
Community Fireguard is about local people taking responsibility for their own fire safety. These people work in small community groups to develop strategies to cope with the local fire threat, the strategies being based on a solid understanding of wildfire behaviour and related safety issues.
Community Fireguard is a high priority activity in CFA, with the number of groups on the
increase across Victoria. To facilitate a rapid expansion of the program, emphasis is now
on training facilitators who will concentrate on raising new groups and supporting existing
groups. This support role will require the ongoing commitment of CFA to the program for it not
to lapse at some future time.
Return to Contents
The issuing of warnings is another critical aspect of community preparedness.
To be successful, the cooperation of the radio and television media will be essential, with the combating agency providing timely and factual briefings. To avoid contributing to the development of any panic in the community the media will need to deal with this matter in a factual and unemotional manner.
Given "the inherent slowness of the delivery of door-to-door warnings" (Oliver, Britton and Hannes 1984), particularly over large areas, use of radio and television is really the only effective means of warning the community. However, to prevent panic from such broadcasts, the community must be well briefed on what to expect and how to react.
Radio and television are important tools available to the Incident Controller to keep the
community informed of developments. They must be utilised in a positive and cooperative
manner.
Return to Contents
WILDFIRE: A NEED FOR FULLY INTEGRATED MANAGEMENT
To minimise life and property loss in the event of wildfire, there must be an integrated
management approach by all agencies having responsibility for any aspect of prevention,
mitigation, response or recovery.
Return to Contents
In planning for evacuation, Miller, Carter and Stephens (1984) considered the following to be
crucial:
With the numerous and varied aspects to be covered, it should be obvious to all that evacuation planning and any implementation will require the cooperative involvement of the broad emergency management community to succeed.
Fire safety education, including provision of the infrastructure necessary to deliver the education and gain ongoing commitment at individual level in the community, must be recognised as an integral part of fire management and resourced accordingly.
An integrated management approach to dealing with the wildfire problem also requires the
respective fire services to operate in partnership with their communities. This partnership must
be based on an understanding that fire services are not omnipotent in dealing with wildfire and
the fostering of a strong, well prepared community that understands the problem and how to
survive.
Return to Contents
Mass evacuation should not be viewed as the panacea for communities threatened by wildfire. It is only one of a number of strategies that must be integrated in a comprehensive emergency management plan, and tailored to meet the needs of individual communities, and the individuals at risk in those communities.
Where evacuation is the appropriate strategy, arrangements for those individuals to be moved must be included in the emergency management plans for their area, so that their safety is assured.
To summarise, the decision on whether to evacuate must be left to the well informed
individual. To overcome panic when the fire arrives, the individual must be well aware of
what is happening and what action to take to survive. To succeed, there must be confidence in the
preparations and ability to survive.
Return to Contents
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BELL, A. 1985, How Bushfires Set Houses Alight - Lessons From Ash Wednesday,
Ecos 43, Autumn 1985, 3-7
JONES, R. 1987, Community Involvement: The Missing Link, Bushfire Bulletin Vol.9,
No's 1 and 2, 1987, p14-15
KRUSEL, N. AND PETRIS, S. 1992, STAYING ALIVE: Lessons learnt from a study of civilian deaths in
the 1983 Ash
HomeWant more information on Community Safety Services? 